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Labor and Employment

by Jerry C. Newsome*
and K. Alex Khoury**
This Article surveys notable developments in labor and employment
law in the Eleventh Circuit from January 1 to December 31, 2003.
During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court handed
down two notable decisions, one involvirng the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA")' and the other involving the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA").2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rendered several notable decisions involving the FLSA, the FMLA, the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 3 and the Railway Labor Act
("RLA")4 during the survey period. The Eleventh Circuit also issued a
significant opinion affecting restrictive covenants under Georgia law.'
I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The FLSA continues to be an active area in federal employment
litigation. During this survey period, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to a case from the Eleventh Circuit' on the issue of removability of FLSA actions.7 The Eleventh Circuit focused primarily on
collective actions under § 216(b),8 but it also considered the joint

*
Partner on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams, LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia. University of Memphis (B.B.A., 1987; J.D., 1991). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
** Associate on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams,
LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College & State University (B.S., 1994); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
4. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (2000).
5. See Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003).
6. See Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 292 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002).
7. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
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employment of migrant workers and the applicability of the agriculture
exemption to nonagricultural enterprises.
Removal
In Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
resolved a long-standing split among the circuits over whether FLSA
actions brought in state court are removable on "federal question"
grounds.1 ° The controversy arose from the seemingly innocuous
wording of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that "[an action to recover
[for a violation of the Act] ...may be maintained against any employer

A.

in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction."" The
...
issue was whether the words "may be maintained... in ...State court"

constituted Congress's express prohibition on removal. 2 Finding that
the wording of § 216(b) falls short of an express prohibition on removal,
the Supreme Court unanimously held that FLSA claims are removable.' 3
Collective Actions
The hottest employment topic in the Eleventh Circuit during this
survey period was the "collective action" procedure under § 216(b). The
court of appeals issued four opinions concerning collective actions under
the FLSA, and many more collective action cases found their way into
the district courts during this survey period. 4
B.

9. 538 U.S. 691 (2003).
10. Id. at 694. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1947)
(holding that § 216(b) precludes removal of FLSA actions properly brought in state court)
with Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 451 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that "nothing in
the FLSA ...expressly prohibits the removal of FLSA actions").
11. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
12. 538 U.S. at 693.
13. Id. at 694, 700.
14. See, e.g., Barron v. Henry County Sch. Sys., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (M.D. Ala. 2003)
(granting conditional class certification); Marsh v. Butler County Sch. Sys., 242 F. Supp.
2d 1086 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (denying class certification absent similarly situated class
members or a commonality of employment actions giving rise to the class's claims); Reed
v. Mobile County Sch. Sys., 246 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (same); Mackenzie v.
Kindred Hosps. E., L.L.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing plaintiffs
claims as moot because plaintiff was offered full relief and other employees' right to file
suit against the employer would not be compromised by resolution of the plaintiffs claims);
Chapman v. Lehman Bros., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that FLSA
collective actions are distinct from FED. R. Cxv. P. 23 class actions and therefore are not
exempt from mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 307
(2000)); Home v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Ala. 2003)
(denying class certification because plaintiff failed to present evidence of similarly situated
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In Prickett v. Dekalb County,15 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that plaintiffs who opted into a collective action were opting into
the entire action, including subsequently added claims.' 6 The named
plaintiffs in Prickett originally filed two FLSA claims against their
employer for overtime pay. Several hundred other employees opted into
the action by filing consent forms with the district court. Subsequently,
the named plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a third FLSA claim
against the employer. The district court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment against the opt-in plaintiffs on the later-added
FLSA claim, concluding that the opt-in plaintiffs were not parties to the
new claim because they had not filed a separate consent form for that
claim."v
The court of appeals examined the following statutory language of
§ 216(b): "No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party ....""
According to the court, the "plain language [of § 216(b)] indicates that
plaintiffs do not opt in or consent to join an action as to specific claims,
but as to the action as a whole." 9 The court of appeals then vacated
the district court's opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 °
In Cameron-Grantv. Maxim HealthcareServices, Inc. ,21 a three-judge
panel of the court of appeals stated that it was considering an issue of
first impression in the Eleventh Circuit: "whether the mootness
principles in the Rule 23[22] class action context apply to collective
actions brought under § 216(b) of the FLSA." a Although the opinion
in Cameron-Grant may have been the first to discuss in detail the
applicability of Rule 23 mootness principles in FLSA collective actions,
another three-judge panel had already considered the issue twice during

employees who wished to opt in); Smith v. Tradesmen Int'l, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (denying plaintiffs motion to permit notification of the collective action to other
employees because three identical affidavits from employees with different job titles,
different responsibilities, and who worked in different locations was insufficient evidence
for the court to determine whether similarly situated employees existed).
15. 349 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
16. Id. at 1297-98.
17. Id. at 1296.
18. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000)).
19. Id. at 1297.
20. Id. at 1298.
21. 347 F.3d 1240 (l1th Cir. 2003).
22. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
23. 347 F.3d at 1245.
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this survey period. 24 The question of which panel was first is relevant
because the court in Cameron-Grant held that Rule 23 mootness
principles do not apply to FLSA collective actions,25 but the earlier
panel applied the Rule 23 principles to vacate26a district court's dismissal
of two FLSA collective actions for mootness.
The named plaintiffs in Cameron-Grantwere four nurses who sued
their employer for failure to pay overtime, failure to pay minimum wage,
and retaliation. After finding that plaintiffs had produced no evidence
that other similarly situated employees wanted to opt in to the action,
the district court denied plaintiffs' motion to allow notification to
potential opt-in plaintiffs. By the time the district court's denial of that
motion was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, however, all four plaintiffs
had dismissed with prejudice all of their claims against defendant.
On appeal the court noted that settlement of a plaintiff's claims
generally moots a cause of action. 28 However, when a Rule 23 class
action is involved, a plaintiff may retain a "personal stake" in class
certification even after the plaintiff's substantive claims have become
moot. 29 But, as the court observed, a Rule 23 class action is a "fundamentally different creature" than a § 216(b) collective action.3 ° In a
Rule 23 class action, the named plaintiff can establish a class regardless
of whether the class members participate in the action, and any
judgment rendered in the case is binding on every member of the class
who does not "opt out." 1 On the other hand, under § 216(b), class
members must opt in to the action before they can benefit from, or be

24. See Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1203 & n.1, 1215-16
(11th Cir. 2003) (decided on Aug. 5, 2003); Gonzalez-Sanchez v. Int'l Paper Co., 346 F.3d
1017, 1019 & n.1, 1023 (11th Cir. 2003) (decided on Sept. 25, 2003). Cameron-Grantwas
decided on October 20, 2003.
25. 347 F.3d at 1249.
26. See Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1215-16; Gonazlez.Sanchez, 346 F.3d at 1023.
Which case was decided first matters because the Eleventh Circuit follows the "earliest
case" rule, which provides that when there is a conflict in circuit authority, the earliest
case controls because a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels and cannot
be overturned except by the court sitting en banc. See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177,
1188 (11th Cir. 1998).
27. 347 F.3d at 1242-44.
28. Id. at 1244.
29. Id. at 1245-47. In its discussion of Rule 23 class actions, the court cited MartinezMendoza to support the proposition that mootness does not terminate a plaintiffs right to
represent a class. Id. at 1247 n.4. Unlike the other cases the court cited to support that
proposition, however, Martinez-Mendoza was not a Rule 23 class action but a § 216(b)
collective action. See Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1203 & n.1.
30. 347 F.3d at 1249.
31. Id. at 1248-49.
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bound by, its outcome. 2 Based upon this distinction, the court held
that a § 216(b) plaintiff does not have an independent right to represent
the class. 3 Thus, a named plaintiff's interest in the action is limited
to the plaintiff's individual claims on the merits.34
The court's holding in Cameron-Grantcalls into question its holdings
in Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion InternationalCorp.35 and GonzalezSanchez v. International Paper Co.," decided earlier in the survey
period. In Martinez-Mendoza and Gonzalez-Sanchez, migrant workers
moved for class certification under § 216(b) of the FLSA.87 In both
cases, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida declared the issue of class certification moot after granting
summary judgment against the named plaintiffs.3 " The Eleventh
Circuit vacated both district court opinions, citing Rule 23 class action
precedent for the proposition that "a plaintiff's capacity to act as
representative of the class is not ipso facto terminated when he loses his
case on the merits."39
Despite a thorough analysis of the issue in Cameron-Grant,and the
absence of any analysis in Martinez-Mendoza and Gonzalez-Sanchez, the
apparently conflicting holdings of these cases have left the issue of
mootness and class representation in FLSA collective actions unsettled
in the Eleventh Circuit.
C.

Joint Employment

Martinez-Mendoza and Gonzalez-Sanchez addressed not only collectiveaction procedure, but also the issue of joint employment.4 ° In these two
cases, concerning nearly identical facts and conclusions of law, migrant
employees of farm labor contractors ("FLCs") were contracted to plant
tree seedlings for Champion International Corporation ("Champion") and
International Paper Company ("International Paper"), respectively. The
FLCs recruited the plaintiffs from Mexico, trained them, transported
them to the work site, and paid their wages. When the work season was
over, the FLCs transported plaintiffs back to Mexico. In addition to
planting seedlings for Champion and International Paper, plaintiffs

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
340 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2003).
346 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2003).
Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1203; Gonzalez-Sanchez, 346 F.3d at 1019.
340 F.3d at 1215; 346 F.3d at 1023.
340 F.3d at 1215-16; see 346 F.3d at 1023.
340 F.3d at 1203-07; 346 F.3d at 1019-20.

1358

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

planted trees for other entities that had contracted with the FLCs for
those services. Plaintiffs sued the FLCs and the paper manufacturers
for minimum wage and overtime violations under the theory of joint
employment. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the paper manufacturers in both cases.4 1
The court of appeals in Martinez-Mendoza identified seven factors for
determining "as a matter of economic reality" whether a joint employment relationship exists.42 Those factors are:
(1) whether the agricultural employer has the power, either alone or
through the FLC, to direct, control, or supervise the worker or the
work performed (such control may be either direct or indirect, taking
into account the nature of the work performed and a reasonable degree
of contract performance oversight and coordination with third parties);
(2) whether the agricultural employer has the power, either alone or in
addition to another employer, directly or indirectly, to hire or fire,
modify the employment conditions, or determine the pay rates or the
methods of wage payment for the worker; (3) the degree of permanency
and duration of the relationship of the parties, in the context of the
agricultural activity at issue; (4) the extent to which the services
rendered by the worker are repetitive, rote tasks requiring skills which
are acquired with relatively little training; (5) whether the activities
performed by the worker are an integral part of the overall business
operation of the agricultural employer; (6) whether the work is
performed on the agricultural employer's premises, rather than on
premises owned or controlled by another business entity; and (7)
whether the agricultural employer undertakes responsibilities in
relation to the worker which are commonly performed by employers,
such as preparing and/or making payroll records, preparing and/or
issuing pay checks, paying FICA taxes, providing workers' compensation insurance, providing field sanitation facilities, housing or
transportation, or providing tools and equipment or materials required
for the job (taking into account the amount of the investment).4"
The court held that the employee bears the burden of proving that the
above factors weigh in favor of finding joint employment by a preponderance of the evidence and that no one factor is dispositive."
The court in Martinez-Mendoza determined that the first factor
weighed against a finding ofjoint employment because the workers were

41. Id.
42. 340 F.3d at 1208-09.
43. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(A)-(G); Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d
1322,1328-29 (11th Cir. 1999)).
44. Id. at 1209.
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supervised by the FLC foremen and planted the trees according to the
FLC's specifications, which met or exceeded the specifications provided
by Champion.45 The court weighed the second factor against joint
employment because the FLC foremen determined when the workers
started work each day, when they took breaks, and when they finished.46 The court also stated that the FLC could alter the type of work
performed by each worker, punish the workers, and alter their pay.4"
The third factor, degree of permanency of the relationship, also weighed
against joint employment because plaintiffs' work for Champion was
"scattered," and the workers "generally never even knew that Champion
was the recipient of their efforts."48 The court weighed the fourth
element in favor of plaintiffs because tree planting, though requiring
some skill, could be learned with very little training.49 The fifth factor,
whether the work was an integral part of Champion's overall business,
weighed against plaintiffs because Champion bought most of its lumber
on the open market and the trees could have been planted by machine
rather than by hand.50 The sixth factor weighed in favor of plaintiffs
because the work they performed was done on Champion's land.5
However, the fact that the workers seldom knew whose land they were
on while planting the trees reduced the weight of this factor because it
weakened plaintiffs' claim that they were economically dependent on
Champion.52 The final factor weighed heavily against a finding of joint
employment because the FLC undertook all of the bureaucratic
responsibilities that employers usually perform for their employees,
whereas Champion provided none of those services.5 3 Determining that
the five factors favoring Champion outweighed the two factors favoring
plaintiffs, the court held that Champion was not plaintiffs' joint
employer
under the FLSA and affirmed the judgment of the district
4
court.

5

45. Id. at 1210-11.
46. Id. at 1211.
47. Id. at 1212.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1212-13.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1214.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1215. The facts and conclusions of law in Gonzalez-Sanchez are sufficiently
similar to the facts and conclusions in Martinez-Mendoza that a separate discussion of the
court's decision in that case would be redundant. See Gonzalez-Sanchez, 346 F.3d at 1020.
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D. Exemptions
In Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit considered
another issue of first impression: whether the FLSA's agricultural
exemption 6 applies to employers that do not actually engage in
agriculture but exist solely to serve an agricultural enterprise."7
Plaintiff in Ares sued his employer, Diaz Landscaping and Nursery, Inc.
(the "Nursery"), for failure to pay overtime wages. The Nursery was
owned by Manuel Diaz ("Diaz"), who also owned Diaz Farms, Inc. (the
"Farm"). The Nursery was the employer of record for all of the Farm's
workers. The sole function of the Nursery was to lease employees and
land to the Farm. The Farm used the Nursery's employees and land to
cultivate trees and ornamental plants. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Nursery, holding that the Nursery
and the Farm "were so intertwined as to constitute a single agricultural
enterprise which is exempt from the requirement to pay overtime
wages. " "
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling.59 According
to the Eleventh Circuit panel, "the availability of the agricultural
exemption should not 'turn upon the technicalities of corporate
organization.'"6 ° Courts may decline to apply the agricultural exemption to employers who serve agricultural enterprises but "perform
separate, self-contained services and operate independently from the
agricultural enterprises they serve." 1 But when the evidence shows
that two companies are actually part of a "single farm enterprise,"
§ 213(b)(12) 62 exempts the employees of both companies from FLSA
requirements. 3
II. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
While not as heavily litigated as the FLSA during this survey period,
FMLA litigation still managed to yield some significant opinions. In
Nevada Departmentof Human Resources v. Hibbs," the Supreme Court

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

318 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 2003).
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (2000).
318 F.3d at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1058.
Id. (quoting Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 312 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1963)).
Id. at 1057.
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (2000).
318 F.3d at 1057.
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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held that the FMLA abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity.6 5 The
decision had an immediate impact on the Eleventh Circuit, prompting
the court of appeals to reverse in part the holding in Bylsma v. Baily,66
which was decided by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama. In Morrison v. Amway Corp.,6 the Eleventh
Circuit chose sides in a circuit split over the proper standard of review
to apply to a motion to dismiss due to the employee's ineligibility to
bring an FMLA action. 6s And finally, in Russell v. North Broward
Hospital,69 the Eleventh Circuit explored the definition of a "serious
health condition" under the FMLA. ' °
A.

Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity

In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,7 1 the Supreme
Court ruled 6-3 that state employees can sue a state employer in federal
court for violation of the FMLA's family-care provision.72 William
Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources
Welfare Division (the "Department"), was fired for overstaying his
authorized-leave time to care for his wife, who had been injured in a car
accident. Hibbs sued the Department in federal court for violation of
§ 2612(a)(1)(C). 7' The district court held that the suit was barred by
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and granted summary
judgment in favor of the Department, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling. 4
The Supreme Court held that "Congress may... abrogate [Eleventh
Amendment] immunity in federal court if it makes its intention to
abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts
pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."7' 5 Examining the language of the FMLA, the Court held
that it clearly revealed congressional intent to abrogate state immunity
because it "enables employees to seek damages 'against any employer
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent

65. Id. at 726.
66. 127 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (M.D. Ala. 2001), rev'd inpart,346 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2003).
67. 323 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2003).
68. Id. at 927.
69. 346 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2003).
70. Id. at 1337.
71. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
72. Id. at 725. The FMLA's family care provision is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000).

73. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000).
74. 538 U.S. at 725.
75. Id. at 726.
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jurisdiction."'76 The only remaining issue in determining whether
Hibbs could maintain his lawsuit was whether Congress abrogated state
immunity in the FMLA pursuant to its powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 7
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to
enforce equal protection of the laws through appropriate legislation.7"
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 5 as giving Congress the power to
enact "prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional
conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct."79 The
unconstitutional conduct sought to be proscribed by the FMLA, according
to the Court, is "gender-based discrimination in the workplace." °
Examining the FMLA's legislative history, the Court concluded that
Congress enacted the FMLA's family leave provision to remedy the
widening gender gap in the allocation of family leave, which was caused
by, and perpetuated, stereotypical "beliefs about the allocation of family
duties.""' The Court held that Congress validly exercised its authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the FMLA because "setting a
minimum standard of family leave for all eligible employees, irrespective
of gender,. . . attacks the formerly state-sanctioned stereotype that only
women are responsible for family caregiving, thereby reducing employers' incentives to engage in discrimination by basing hiring and
promotion decisions on stereotypes." 2
The impact of Hibbs in the Eleventh Circuit was immediate. In
8
Bylsma v. Freeman,"
the court of appeals reversed the Middle District
of Alabama's holding that Congress had not validly abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the family care provision of the FMLA."4
But Hibbs may not have opened the floodgates to state employees for all
types of FMLA claims.8 5 In Garrett v. University of Alabama Board of
Trustees, 6 the Eleventh Circuit held that Congress did not have the
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity for FMLA claims

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2000)).
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 730 (citing S. REP. No. 103-3, at 14-15 (1993)).
Id. at 737.
346 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1324. See Bylsma v. Bailey, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1234 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
See Bylsma, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999).
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concerning an employee's leave to attend to personal medical needs.8 7
Garrett is probably still good law because the Supreme Court in Hibbs
justified abrogation in family care leave cases as a means of combatting
the stereotype of women as caregivers in the home. 8 That concern is
not implicated when the individual requiring care is the employee.
The Motion to Dismiss Standard
In Morrison v. Amway Corp.,89 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether a district court should use the Rule 12(b)(1) 90 or Rule 5691
standard of review "when reviewing a defendant's motion to dismiss an
FMLA action" on grounds of employee eligibility.9 2 As the court in
93
Morrison noted, not only are the circuits split on the
94 issue, but a split
Circuit.
Eleventh
the
within
existed
also
of opinion
Plaintiff in Morrison sued his employer, Amway Corporation ("Amway"), for retaliation under the FMLA.9" Amway moved to dismiss the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
to establish that he was an
because, it argued, plaintiff had failed
"eligible employee" under the FMLA.9" The district court agreed and
dismissed the action.97
The court of appeals began its analysis by reviewing the circumstances
under which the Rule 56 and Rule 12(b)(1) standards of review apply.9"
The Rule 12(b)(1) standard applies to jurisdictional challenges that "can
be decided without reference to the merits of the underlying claim."99

B.

87. Id. at 1219-20. The FMLA leave provision involving personal medical needs is
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000).
88. 538 U.S. at 730.
89. 323 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2003).

90. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
91. FED. R. CIrv. P. 56.
92. 323 F.3d at 921-22.
93. See id. at 928 n.11.
94. See id. at 928-29.
95. The FMLA's retaliation provision is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2000).
96. An "eligible employee" under the FMLA is one who was employed for at least
twelve months with the employer and must have worked at least 1250 hours with the
employer in the previous twelve months. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2000). Section 2611(2)(B),
however, excludes employees who worked at a site where the employer employed less than
fifty people, if the total number of employees working for that employer within seventy-five
miles of that worksite is less than fifty. Amway argued that it employed less than fifty
people within seventy-five miles of plaintiffs worksite, and therefore, plaintiff was not an
eligible employee pursuant to § 2611(2)(B). 323 F.3d at 923.
97. 323 F.3d at 922.
98. Id. at 924-25.
99. Id.
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If the motion to dismiss requires the court to make a determination on
the merits of the case, the Rule 56 standard should be used."° The
court observed that in an FMLA action, jurisdiction is "intertwined" with
the merits of the action because "eligible-employee status ... is a
threshold jurisdictional question ... that also appears to be a prima

facie element for recovery." 1
The court observed that under the Rule 56 standard, plaintiffs are
entitled to a presumption of truthfulness regarding facts relevant to the
merits of the action, whereas no such presumption exists when a court
considers a plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations. 2 Because an eligibility challenge is an attack on both jurisdiction and the merits in an FMLA
action, the court held that resolution of factual disputes on the issue is
reserved for the jury.1 3 Accordingly, the court reversed the district
court for not reviewing Amway's motion to dismiss under the standard
for Rule 56.104
C. Serious Health Conditions
In Russell v. North Broward Hospital,"°5 the Eleventh Circuit held
that a "serious health condition" under the FMLA is a condition
requiring more than three consecutive full days of incapacity.'0 ° The
court's holding may prove particularly helpful in clarifying the rights of
employers and employees under the FMLA's intermittent leave
provision."
The case arose when plaintiff slipped and fell while working for North
Broward Hospital (the "Hospital"), breaking her wrist and elbow. Over
the next ten days, plaintiff worked intermittently due to doctors
appointments and episodes of severe pain. Ultimately, the Hospital
terminated plaintiff's employment due to "her excessive absenteeism." 10

8

Plaintiff sued under the FMLA, claiming that her absences

fell within the twelve weeks of leave she was entitled to under the Act
because her injuries constituted a serious health condition.0 9 At trial
the judge instructed the jury that a serious health condition was an
100. Id. at 925.
101. Id. at 927 (citations omitted).
102.

Id. at 925.

103. Id. at 928.
104. Id. at 930.
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.
at 1338.

346 F.3d at 1335 (2003).

Id. at 1346.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (2000).
346 F.3d at 1339.
Id. Plaintiff had a history of attendance problems prior to her accident. See id.
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injury requiring more than three consecutive calendar days of incapacity." ° When the jury asked whether three consecutive partial days of
incapacity would satisfy the requirement, the judge responded that
"three consecutive calendar days, [seventy-two] hours or more," was
required."' The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the Hospital, and
1 2
plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals began by noting that the FMLA allows an
employee twelve workweeks of leave per year "'because of a serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of the position of such employee.'""' 3 The FMLA defines a
"serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical
or mental condition that involves ... continuing treatment by a health
care provider."" 4 "Continuing treatment," however, is not defined in
the FMLA." 5 For this definition, the court turned to a Department of
Labor regulation that defines "continuing treatment" as "[a] period of
incapacity (i.e., inability to work, attend school or perform other regular
daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor,
or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive calendar days." 6
Plaintiff argued that her seven consecutive partial days of incapacity
were sufficient to satisfy the regulation." 7 The court rejected her
argument, holding that the regulation requires three consecutive full
days of incapacity.'
The court held that "[plartial days do not count,
except at the beginning or end of the 'period of incapacity' in order to
make up the 'more than' element."" 9
III.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

The only decision from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concerning the NLRA during this survey period was Marine Engineers
Beneficial Ass'n v. GFC Crane Consultants, Inc. ("Marine").120
In
Marine the court of appeals held that a notice of termination was not

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000)).
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2000)).
Id.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)).
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
331 F.3d 1287 (lth Cir. 2003).
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equivalent to a notice of modification for the purpose of triggering a
continuation clause in the collective bargaining agreement.' 2 '
In 1995 the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association ("MEBA") entered
into a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA" or "Agreement") with
G.F.C. Crane Consultants, Inc. ("GFC"). The CBA contained a continuation clause that allowed for the terms of the CBA to remain in effect
during negotiations to modify the Agreement or until the parties reached
an impasse in such negotiations. At the end of the initial five-year term,
the Agreement would automatically renew on a year-to-year basis unless
either MEBA or GFC notified the other that it wanted to modify the
Agreement. Such notice of modification triggered the continuation
clause.22
Near the end of the five-year term, MEBA notified GFC that it wished
to modify the Agreement. GFC responded by notifying MEBA that it
was going to terminate the Agreement at the end of the five-year term.
GFC told MEBA that it was willing to negotiate a new agreement, and
the parties agreed to extend the terms of the old agreement for thirty
days while the parties worked out a new collective bargaining agreement. After the thirty-day extension expired, but before a new
agreement had been reached, MEBA lodged several complaints with
GFC involving various employee issues. GFC denied those complaints
and refused to arbitrate because it believed that the CBA's arbitration
provisions had expired at the end of the thirty-day extension. MEBA
sought to compel GFC to arbitrate by filing suit in federal district court.
The district court ordered GFC to arbitrate under the terms of the 1995
CBA, holding that GFC's notice of termination was the "functional
equivalent" of a notice to modify, and therefore, the terms of the CBA
were still in effect pursuant to the continuation clause.'23

121. Id. at 1291.
122. Id. at 1288-89. Specifically, the continuation clause provided as follows:
The provisions of this Agreement shall become effective from August 14, 1995, and
shall remain in full force and effect until August 14, 2000. It shall automatically
be renewed from year to year thereafter unless either party shall notify the other,
in writing, at least sixty (60) days prior but no sooner than ninety (90) days prior
to the expiration or anniversary date, that it desires to modify this Agreement.
In the event that such notice is given, negotiations shall begin not later than
thirty (30) days prior to the expiration or anniversary date. The terms of the
Agreement at the time of notice to modify was given shall continue in effect until
mutual agreement on the proposed modifications or an impasse has been reached.
Id. at 1289 n.1.
123. Id. at 1289-90.
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The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that GFC's
12 4
notice of termination did not trigger the continuation clause.
According to the appellate court, "[n]otices to modify and notices to
terminate are not equivalent except in the face of contractual language
that equates those types of notice."'25 The court also rejected MEBA's
alternative argument that the arbitration provisions of the CBA were
still in effect because MEBA triggered the continuation clause when it
notified GFC of its desire to modify the agreement.'26 The court held
that the purpose of the continuation clause "was to continue the terms
of the agreement until the parties reached an agreement on the
modification proposals or impasse was reached on those modification
proposals. By statutorily terminating, GFC made those contract-based
modification negotiations,
and, by extension, the contract continuation
12 7
clause, moot."

IV. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT ("RLA")

A.

Preemption
In Geddes v. American Airlines, Inc.,128 the court of appeals considered an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit: whether the
RLA "has the ... preemptive force necessary to create federal removal

jurisdiction." 29 Geddes sued American Airlines, Inc. ("American") in
Florida state court for defamation, negligence, and negligent supervision
arising from its handling of a complaint against him. American removed
the case to federal court. According to American, federal question
jurisdiction existed because it conducted the investigation of the
complaint against Geddes in accordance with a collective bargaining
agreement made under, and governed by, the RLA. The district court
denied Geddes's motion to remand because it concluded that the RLA
completely preempted Geddes's state tort claims.'
The district court
based its finding that the RLA completely preempted state law claims
on the similarities between the RLA and the Labor Management

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 1291.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
321 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1351-52.
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Relations Act ("LMRA"),"' which
has been held to support removal
132
due to complete preemption.
The court of appeals began its analysis by distinguishing ordinary
preemption from complete preemption. 13
The court noted that "a
federal law may substantively displace state law under ordinary
preemption but lack the extraordinary force to create federal removal
jurisdiction under the doctrine of complete preemption."'1'
Such
"'extraordinary' preemptive force must be manifest in the clearly
expressed intent of Congress."135 Looking at the language and legislative history of the RLA, the court found no indication that Congress
intended the RLA to create a federal cause of action for dispute
resolution under the Act.' 3' Accordingly, the court held that the RLA
does not completely preempt state law claims, and it reversed the
37
district court ruling. 1
B.

Notice

In Steward v. Mann, 3 ' the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered two issues arising from the RLA's due-notice requirement:' 31 (1) whether the due-notice requirement applies to proceedings
before an airline board of adjustment, 140 and (2) what kind of notice is
required under the due-notice provision.' 4'
The dispute in this case arose between two groups of pilots, referred
to herein as "the Steward pilots" and "the Mann pilots," over their
seniority standing at AirTran Airways, Inc. The Mann pilots successfully petitioned to have an arbitrator revise AirTran's seniority rankings in
such a way that the Mann pilots moved ahead of the Steward pilots.
The arbitrator did not send notice of the arbitration to the Steward
pilots despite the fact that their seniority could have been, and was,

131. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
132. 321 F.3d at 1354-55.
133. Id. at 1352-53. Although ordinary preemption can be pleaded as an affirmative
defense to state law claims in state or federal court, "a case may not be removed to federal
court on the basis of a federal defense, including that of federal preemption." Id. Complete
preemption, on the other hand, exists only when the federal statute's preemptive force is
so extraordinary that it creates a federal cause of action. Id. at 1353.
134. Id. at 1353.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1354.
137. Id. at 1357. In so holding, the court declined to follow precedent to the contrary
from the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See id. at 1356 & n.5.
138. 351 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2003).
139. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j) (2000).
140. 351 F.3d at 1344. This issue was one of first impression.
141. Id. at 1345.
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adversely affected by the arbitrator's ruling. At least three of the
Steward pilots (out of seven) found out about the arbitration and
attended. The Steward pilots then filed suit in federal court and
succeeded in getting the arbitrator's award set aside for violation of the
RLA's due-notice provision. 1 2 The court of appeals affirmed.'"
The court of appeals first considered whether the RLA's due-notice
requirement applied to proceedings before an airline adjustment
board.'" The court acknowledged that Congress expressly stated that
section 153 of the RLA, the section that contains the due-notice
provision, does not apply to proceedings before airline adjustment
boards.'45 Nevertheless, relying on a Supreme Court opinion instructing it to look at the entirety of the RLA rather than to those provisions
that expressly apply to the airline industry, the court held that the
RLA's due-notice requirement applied to proceedings before the airline
adjustment board.' 4 The court justified its holding by emphasizing
that Congress's intent when extending applicability of the RLA to the
airline industry was to "extend the same benefits and obligations to air
carriers "and
their employees that already applied to the railroad
147
industry.
The court then considered the type of notice required by the RLA's
due-notice provision.'" The Mann pilots argued that the Steward
pilots had constructive notice of the arbitration and that such notice
satisfied the due-notice requirement. 149 The court of appeals rejected
this argument, holding instead that the airline adjustment board was
required to personally notify any involved employees who were not
represented at the adjustment board hearing. 50 The court held that
the notice could be "informal and delivered by mail," but it must be
adequate, i.e., it must include the time, date, and location of the
hearing.'

142. Id. at 1338-44.
143. Id. at 1348.
144.

Id. at 1344.

145. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 182 (2000)).
146. Id. (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 685-89
(1963)).

147. Id. at 1345 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 567 F.
Supp. 66, 76 (S.D. Tex. 1983)). Texas Internationalwas the only published opinion that
considered the issue of the due notice provision's applicability to airlines prior to Steward.

Id.
148.

Id.

149. Id. at 1343.
150. Id. at 1346.

151. Id. (citations omitted).
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C. Damages
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees 151 stands out from the other labor and employment cases
during this survey year. This case is significant not for what it holds,
but because the majority used the opinion to urge the court of appeals
to reconsider, en banc, Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that an
employer cannot
recover damages under the RLA for the wrongful acts
15 3
of a union.
This case evolved from a dispute between CSX Transportation, Inc.
("CSX") and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (the
"BMWE") over CSX's practice of allowing supervisors to make small
repairs while they inspected the company's railroad tracks and CSX's
refusal to award a BMWE member a track-repairman position. After
fruitless discussions between the parties to resolve the issues, the
BMWE called an eleven-state strike against CSX without giving the
company any formal or informal notice. CSX sued the BMWE in the
Middle District of Florida, seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
and a preliminary injunction to stop the strike and damages. The
district court granted the TRO and the preliminary injunction but
dismissed CSX's claim for damages, which the court held were unavailable under the RLA."'
The court of appeals held that by striking over a minor dispute and
striking without giving notice, the BMWE had purposely violated the
RLA.' 55 Turning to the issue of damages, the court stated that were
it "writing on a clean slate, [it] would hold that ...

this case is the

quintessential 'appropriate' case for an action for damages under the
RLA." 5 s But the court was not writing on a clean slate. In 1958 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, in Louisville
& Nashville Railroad v. Brown,'57 that Congress did not create a
"statutory right of action for damages" under the RLA. 55 Reluctantly
acknowledging that it was bound by the decision in Brown, the court
held that CSX could not recover damages against the BMWE.' 59

152. 327 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
153. Id. at 1330.
154. Id. at 1311-14.
155. Id. at 1324. The court held that the BMVWE had violated sections 152, Second and
153, First by striking over a minor dispute. Id. at 1323-24. The court also held that the
BMWE violated section 152, First by striking without giving notice. Id.
156. Id. at 1327.
157. 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1958).
158. Id. at 155.
159. 327 F.3d at 1327.
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Despite following Brown, the court built a strong argument for
overturning, or at least limiting, Brown's holding. The court looked at
the BMWE's history of using secret strikes 160 and noted that the
unavailability of remedial damages for such behavior allowed the BMWE
to "impose[] economic harm on carriers ... with impunity." 1 ' The
court observed that the purpose of the RLA, to allow employers and
employees to settle disputes while avoiding strikes and the disruption of
commerce, was frustrated by the current law prohibiting damages
because it deprives employers of any recourse when bad faith actors like
the BMWE strike without notice."6 2 The court reasoned that damages
should be available under the RLA on a case-by-case basis under the
general rule, announced after the Fifth Circuit's holding in Brown, that
"absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts
have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action brought pursuant to a federal statute."6 3
V.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Keener v. Convergys Corp."M
limited the scope of injunctive relief available in noncompete cases by
preventing the district court from enjoining enforcement of a noncompete
clause outside of the state whose law it applied to invalidate the
clause. 6 '
Factually, Keener is not atypical of multi-state restrictive covenant
cases. Plaintiff in Keener entered into a noncompete agreement with
Convergys Corporation ("Convergys") that included an Ohio choice of law
provision. Plaintiff later accepted employment in Savannah, Georgia,
with one of Convergys's competitors. Seeking to forestall an attempt by
Convergys to enforce his noncompete agreement, plaintiff told Convergys
he was leaving the company to take a job in the banking industry.
Plaintiff then filed an action with the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that his
noncompete agreement with Convergys was unenforceable and an

160. The court noted that the BMWE had planned secret strikes at least four times in
the previous year. Id. at 1324 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Bhd. of Maint. of
Way Employees, 143 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678-85 (N.D. Tex. 2001)).
161. Id. at 1325.
162. See id. at 1328-29. As the court noted, injunctive relief, the preferred remedy in
RLA actions, is rendered useless to employers when employees launch a secret strike. Id.
at 1328
163. Id. at 1325 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65-66
(1992)).
164. 342 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003).
165. Id. at 1266.
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injunction to prevent Convergys from trying to enforce the clause.'
The district court disregarded the choice of law provision in plaintiff's
employment contract 6 7 and applied Georgia law because the noncomThe district court
pete agreement violated Georgia's public policy."
held that under Georgia law, the noncompete agreement was unenforceable and enjoined Convergys from seeking to enforce the noncompete
agreement "in any court worldwide."'69
A.

Choice of Law

Uncertain about Georgia's conflict-of-laws rules concerning contractual
choice of law provisions, the court of appeals certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Georgia:
Whether a court applying Georgia conflict of law rules follows the
language of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 187(2) and,
therefore, first must ascertain whether Georgia has a "materially
greater interest" in applying Georgia law, rather than the contractually
selected forum's law, before it elects to apply Georgia law to invalidate
170
a non-compete agreement as contrary to Georgia public policy.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that in Georgia, a contractual choice
of law clause would not be honored if applying the chosen forum's law
produced a result that contravened Georgia public policy.' 71 In light
of the Georgia Supreme Court's answer to its certified question and
because plaintiff's noncompete agreement with Convergys contravened
affirmed the district court's
Georgia's public policy, the Eleventh Circuit
172
declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff.

166. Keener v. Convergys Corp., 312 F.3d 1236, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2002).
167. The parties had agreed that Ohio law would apply to any contract disputes. 342
F.3d at 1268 n.2. Ohio law allows courts to "blue pencil" unreasonable restrictive
covenants; Georgia law does not. Id. at 1268 & n.2.
168. Georgia's public policy disfavors unreasonable or overbroad restrictive covenants
in employment contracts. See, e.g., Keener v. Convergys Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 137980 (S.D. Ga. 2002), rev'd in part, 342 F.3d at 1271. The district court held that the
noncompete agreement in Keener was unreasonable and violated Georgia's public policy,
inter alia, because the scope of the restriction was indeterminable at the time it was
entered into and could have potentially prevented plaintiff from competing with Convergys
worldwide. Id. at 1381-82.

169. 342 F.3d at 1269.
170. 312 F.3d at 1241.
171.

See Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 276 Ga. 808, 810-12, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85-87 (2003).

172. 342 F.3d at 1268-69.
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Scope of Injunctive Relief

The court of appeals next reviewed the district court's injunction3
prohibiting the enforcement of the clause in any court worldwide.1
The court of appeals held that the district court abused its discretion by
granting a "worldwide" injunction because granting such an expansive
injunction impermissibly "[imputed Georgia's] public policy decisions
nationwide."'74 Accordingly, the court ordered that the injunction "be
modified to preclude Convergys from enforcing the [noncompete clause]
in Georgia only."'75
The court of appeals appears to have limited its holding on the
nationwide-injunction issue to cases in which the public policy of the
forum state supersedes a contractual choice of law provision.'7 6
Presumably, after Keener, a district court in a diversity action can still
issue a nationwide injunction preventing the enforcement of a noncompete agreement if the district court applies the law of the forum chosen
by the parties. Under such circumstances, the losing party cannot
complain of losing the benefit of his bargain. 77
Other factors seemed to influence the court's decision to reverse the
district court's injunction in Keener, though the weight given to these
factors is unclear. The court noted that plaintiff had misled Convergys
about his job with a competitor in order to prevent Convergys from
enforcing the noncompete agreement. 178 While the misrepresentation
alone was not egregious, the court stated that plaintiff's misrepresentation, coupled with the fact that he was seeking a declaratory judgment
to preempt the enforcement of his noncompete agreement, "depriv[ed]
Convergys of the opportunity of enforcing the [noncompete agreement]
in Ohio, under Ohio law, as provided by the [noncompete agreement].' 79
Georgia's strict scrutiny of restrictive covenants has made it a friendly
forum for out-of-state employees seeking to escape contractual agree-

173. Id. at 1269.
174.

Id.

175. Id. at 1270.
176. See id. ("The district court extended the injunction beyond a reasonable scope by
permitting the public policy interests of Georgia to declare a[0 [noncompete agreement]
unenforceable nationwide, when its law was not intended by the partiesto apply in the first
place.") (emphasis added).
177. See id. at 1269 ("To permit a nationwide injunction would in effect interfere both
with parties' ability to contract and their ability to enforce appropriately derived
expectations.").
178. Id. at 1270.
179. Id.
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ments not to compete with a former employer.' s Keener is not likely
to stop the flow of employees seeking refuge in Georgia's favorable
restrictive covenant laws, but it severely limits their ability to use the
federal courts to export the benefit of those laws to other states at the
expense of their former employers.

180. This "forum shopping" by out-of-state employees was described by the district
court in Keener as one of "[the aches and pains of federalism." 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1379,
rev'd in part, 342 F.2d at 1271.

